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Space vehicle staging and separation events require 
pyrotechnic devices. They are single-use mechanisms 
that cannot be tested, nor can failure-tolerant 
performance be demonstrated in actual flight articles 
prior to flight use. This necessitates the implementation 
of a robust design and test approach coupled with a fully 
redundant, failure-tolerant explosive mechanism to 
ensure that the system functions even in the event of a 
single failure.  
 
Historically, NASA has followed the single failure--
tolerant (SFT) design philosophy for all human-rated 
spacecraft, including the Space Shuttle Program. 
Following the end of this program, aerospace companies 
proposed building the next generation human-rated 
vehicles with off-the-shelf, non-redundant, zero-failure-
tolerant (ZFT) separation systems.  
 
Currently, spacecraft and launch vehicle providers for 
both the Orion and Commercial Crew Programs (CCPs) 
plan to deviate from the heritage safety approach and 
NASA’s SFT human rating requirements. Both 
programs’ partners have base-lined ZFT frangible joints 
for vehicle staging and fairing separation. These joints 
are commercially available from pyrotechnic vendors. 
Non-human-rated missions have flown them numerous 
times. The joints are relatively easy to integrate 
structurally within the spacecraft. In addition, the 
separation event is debris free, and the resultant pyro 
shock is lower than that of other design solutions.  
 
It is, however, a serious deficiency to lack failure 
tolerance. When used for critical applications on 
human-rated vehicles, a single failure could potentially 
lead to loss of crew (LOC) or loss of mission (LOM)).  
 
The Engineering and Safety & Mission Assurance 
directorates within the NASA Johnson Space Center 
took action to address this safety issue by initiating a 
project to develop a fully redundant, SFT frangible joint 
design, known as the Flat H. Critical to the ability to 
retrofit on launch vehicles being developed, the SFT 
mechanisms must fit within the same three-dimensional 
envelope as current designs as well as meet structural 
loads requirements. There is increased mass associated 
with the redundant design, and the goal is to minimize 
the weight impact as much as possible. These 
requirements presented significant challenges, both 
technically and financially; these challenges will be 
explored in this paper. 
 
Perhaps greater than the technical issues confronted 
during this design process, were the financial 
considerations.  These were a significant part of the 
story of this design and development plan. Insufficient 
financial and labor resources were formidable barriers 
to completing this project.  
 
Nevertheless, JSC personnel successfully conducted 
several test series at JSC with very useful results.  The 
many lessons learned drove design improvements, 
performance efficiency, and increased functional 
reliability.  
 
This paper examines the significant technical and 
financial challenges that these requirements posed to the 
project team. It discusses the evolution of the SFT 
frangible joint design, including optimization, testing, 
and successful partnering of the Johnson Space Center 
(JSC) engineering and JSC safety organizations, to 
enhance the flight safety margin for America’s next 
generation of human-rated space vehicles. 
 
FRANGIBLE JOINT DESCRIPTION 
The primary function of a frangible joint is to separate 
launch vehicle stages or payload fairings. It offers a 
debris-free separation with significantly lower shock 
than a Linear Shaped Charge (LSC) separation system, 
and it weighs less than discrete release devices, such as 
separation nuts and explosive bolts. Figure 1 depicts 
where frangible joints are often used on a launch 
vehicle. Current unmanned spacecraft flight designs 
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implement ignition redundancy by detonating the ends 
of the separation segments with zero-failure tolerance in 
the single cord between the detonators. Past attempts to 
achieve pyrotechnic failure tolerance focused on 
maintaining the existing exterior joint geometry and 
only altered the design interior by placing two explosive 
cords in the same relative location where there 
previously had been only one. This option was 
minimally successful. In contrast, the design described 
in this document is fully redundant and has two 
independent explosive trains. 
 
 
Figure 1: Spacecraft Separation Systems Using 
Frangible Joints 
The frangible joint design has an explosive cord 
centered inside a steel tube with an elastomeric charge 
holder. This is the expansion tube assembly (XTA).  
The XTA serves the dual purpose of transferring the 
explosive cord energy to the joint while also containing 
the pyrotechnic combustion by-products. Detonation of 
the explosive cord, also known as a mild detonating fuse 
(MDF), sends a shock wave through the structure and 
expands the confinement tube. Both the shock and 
expansion force contribute to the separation. 
 
In Figure 2, the cross-sectional shape of the tube has 
two flat sides and the cord centered between the flats. 
Detonating the cord returns the tube to a round shape 
and fractures the structure in its expansion path. 
 
 
Figure 2: Cross Section of a Single XTA Frangible 
Joint  
Figure 3 illustrates the before and after of a typical 





Figure 3: Typical Expanding Tube Assembly  




          









FRANGIBLE JOINT APPLICATION 
Figure 5 illustrates a typical fairing separation system. 
  
Figure 5: Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) Frangible 
Application.  
These separation designs are ZFT, and the Orion 
Program and the CCP have designated them for use in 
highly critical operations where failure to function, or 
premature function, leads to LOC/LOM outcomes.  
 
To date, no NASA human-rated program has selected 
the use of ZFT frangible joints. The Shuttle Program for 
emergency crew egress selected and flew XTA sub-
assemblies installed in the side hatch and overhead 
window jettison assemblies to break a series of bolts. 
They were not required to sever a continuous joint 
segment, as currently proposed for the Orion and CCP 
vehicles. These SSP designs were aligned with the 
NASA heritage SFT design philosophy, using redundant 
XTAs to maximize the best chance for system function, 
which is in stark contrast to the ZFT XTA  proposed for 
use in the next generation of spacecraft. 
 
PYROTECHNIC COMPONENT FAILURES 
NASA has documented several cases, specifically 
relevant to frangible joints, in which ZFT pyrotechnic 
devices have failed. The root causes of some component 
failures have been resolved; however, other incidents 
remain unresolved, even after extensive investigations. 
Due to following best practices and employing 
functionally redundant pyrotechnic trains in human 
spacecraft, it is possible that more flight failures 
occurred than were discovered and documented. Several 
ZFT failure cases are discussed below as illustrative 
examples.   
 
Case Study 1: Shuttle Overhead Window Jettison 
Qualification Test 
The Space Shuttle Orbiter overhead window assembly 
contained explosives to allow ground egress in case the 
crew was not able to exit normally through the side 
hatch upon landing. The inner window contained dual 
expansion tube assemblies, while the outer window had 
dual MDF lines (see Figure 6).  
 
After a successful jettison of the outer window during a 
qualification test, inspection revealed that one of the 
MDF lines had not fired as planned. The root cause of 
the MDF failure remains unknown. The implementation 




Figure 6:  Shuttle Overhead Window Jettison System 
 
Case Study 2: Shuttle Flexible Confined Detonating 
Cord (FCDC) Failure 
 
During safing operations following the retirement of the 
Shuttle Orbiters, the Program management made the 
decision to fire these lines in place due to the extensive 
efforts required for complete removal. As a result, 
technicians removed all pyrotechnic devices from the 
vehicles, with the exception of the window egress 
system FCDC lines and the exterior T-handle initiator. 
They also installed swell cap function indicators on the 
end of each line. 
 
Upon firing, one of the caps did not swell as expected, 
indicating that the line did not fully function. Further 
investigation revealed a fault between an elbow fitting 
and the swell cap located at the center console (see 
Figure 7).  
 
Although the root cause of the failure was not 
determined, the leading theory is that repeated and 
excessive bending of the lines during cockpit 
refurbishment degraded the FCDC.  
 
System functionality was achieved specifically due to 
SFT redundant design implementation. 
 
 
Figure 7:  Shuttle FCDC Lines Being Configured for 
Safing 
FLAT-H CONCEPTUAL DESIGN AND 
OPERATION 
Figure 8 illustrates how the Flat-H design is configured. 
Both break plates have shelves extending out close to 
the center of the flat surfaces of the XTAs. When one or 
both XTAs function, the expansion rotates the 
corresponding break plate shelves. The rotation of the 
shelves severs the ligaments in both break plates, 
separating the Flat H joint. A combination of tension 




Figure 8: Flat H Redundant Frangible Joint with Two 
Expanding Tubes  
Our new design has two XTAs unlike the earlier 
designs, and the XTAs are positioned horizontally, as 
opposed to the vertical positions as shown in Figure 2. 
This “flat” position makes a more compact assembly for 
structural support and stability. The Flat-H assembly is 
comprised of two XTAs that join the adjacent 
structures, along with two break plates, which sandwich 
the XTAs and spacers with fasteners, thereby holding 
the assembly together.  Thus, SFT status can be 
achieved. 
 
PROTOTYPE TESTING:  FRANGIBLE JOINT 
LESSONS LEARNED 
In early 2014, the Johnson Space Center (JSC) 
Pyrotechnics Group began the fabrication and 
preliminary evaluation of the Flat-H design. 
Requirements dictated that the design could be 
retrofitted on existing vehicle configurations and that it 
could accommodate the flight loads for the Orion 
Service Module fairing separation. The early Project 
Objectives were: 
 
 Developing concepts into fabrication drawings;  
 Performing approximately 15 firings at JSC; 
 Developing hardware for further work to 
perform testing at White Sands Test Facility 
(WSTF) using high speed data acquisition 
equipment; and,  
 Conducting stress analysis and load testing. 
 
The schedule was success-oriented and provided a 
limited window of opportunity to leverage WSTF 
assets. Since the schedule for testing opportunities was 
prohibitive of a full typical design review cycle, rapid 
pace events occurred. No delays for dynamic analysis, 
no predictive models, and no time for failure analysis, if 
needed, were possible. Thus, the empirical design 
development approach was based exclusively on trial-
and-error, professional experience, and intuition.  Data 
collection and review supported the design refinement 
process. 
 
The JSC tests resulted in successful separation using a 
single XTA, and demonstrated that the design could 
sustain compression and tensile structural loads. 
Unfortunately, when testing a similar configuration at 
WSTF the joint failed to separate.  The team believes 
movement in the spacers and flexing of the bolts that 
hold the joint together caused the failures. With the 
unfavorable test results at WSTF, design momentum 
was temporarily lost.  
 
A tremendous wealth of data from the WSTF testing 
required assessment, reduction and analysis to proceed. 
The analysis revealed exactly what happened to the 
Flat-H during the testing. Data analysis determined that 
there was relative motion between the joint components 
where there should have been none. Energy from the 
XTA firing was lost due to this motion, and this energy 
loss prevented the joint from breaking fully. Using the 
WSTF failure test data, JSC Pyrotechnic group 
completed reconstruction of the analysis models. The 
analysis revealed that modifications to the design would 
correct the failure. Consequently, there was excellent 
correlation between the actual WSTF test data and the 
JSC analytic model data. The results of this initial test 
phase motivated further investment in the Flat H 
concept. 
 
This further investment was accompanied by an 
augmentation of project goals, pursuing closure of the 
initial test matrix with the common goal of serving all 
three human spaceflight programs – Orion, Space 
Launch System (SLS), and Commercial Crew 
Programs.  Note this is a significantly larger role than 
originally envisioned for this project. 
 
The funding of the new model validation approach 
increased design credibility, test predictions, and an 
understanding of component interactions for risk 
mitigation.  In addition, it enabled team members to 
create purposeful analytic models, employing test data 
and prior corporate test knowledge of frangible joint 
technology. 
 
The potential on-ramp of three programs provides for 
the utilization of the technology, needing only an 
opportunity to pass performance tests at JSC Energy 
Systems Test Area (ESTA) and WSTF.   It also enables 
us to take the calculated steps to prepare for the next set 
of configurations and tests, including assessing load 
cases with new geometry and curved assemblies.  
 
2016 FLAT-H FORWARD  
The project leadership anticipates returning to the 
Human Exploration Operations Mission Directorate 
(HEOMD) armed with the necessary data that warrants 
the investment into the next project phase that develops 
a frangible joint specific for Orion vehicle needs.  This 
will reduce the LOC risk for future flights namely 
Orion’s EM-3 mission and beyond where there are crew 
onboard. Early in the development process, the project 
may have to add the rolling of three, 5-foot joint 
segments as an activity to demonstrate the feasibility of 
the manufacturing process that emulates the Orion 
vehicle’s geometry. Additional funding will be required, 
and a four-month timeline extension to procure curved 
geometry sections for combined load tests and the 
statistical data base enhancement.  The estimated start 
date will be fiscal year 2017. 
 
The JSC Pyrotechnics Group mitigated the flaw in the 
design, proposed a new test results based design 
configuration that precluded relative motion in testing, 
and successfully fractured the joint along its length 
using lower core load MDF than initially predicted.  
These are very significant strides made on the partial 
funding and in a matter of a few months. 
 
Further investment has increased confidence in the SFT 
technology readiness state for full-scale development.  
Also, it gives the project an opportunity to demonstrate 
low cost additional functional tests at ESTA, as well as 
structural load carrying capability. This two-pronged 
data-driven approach entails modeling and analysis 
coupled with non-destructive and destructive testing. 
The data rich test suite attains the ultimate goal of the 
creation of an analytic joint model that can be used to 
assess a multitude of configurations prior to entering the 
destructive test validation phase of any vehicle or 
geometry specific joint design. 
 
NEW FLAT-H DESIGN APPROACH  
Unlike the first approach trial-and-error, test-only 
methodology, this new project plan includes modeling 
and analysis coupled with validation testing. It will save 
schedule time and provide good data correlation. 
Exploiting LS-DYNA simulation should yield the 
highest fidelity output in both 2D and 3D configurations 
yet available.    
 
The modeling and analysis tasks to be completed 
include:   
1. Construct models to recreate the results from 
previous ESTA testing.   
2. Reconstruct models to recreate the results from 
previous WSTF testing.  
3. Build models to evaluate enhanced designs  
4. Perform static loads analysis using appropriate 
models. 
The rationale for requesting both 2D and 3D models is 
that 2D evaluation is limited in certain areas. One 
rationale specifically concerns the assembly bolt 
response to firing. The 2D model treats the through bolt 
as a solid, unmoving beam, whereas the 3D model more 
accurately shows the flexure of the fastener. That 
bending equates to energy loss, which is then 
unavailable to break the joint. Both model 
configurations will enhance our understanding of how 
the joint behaves. The initial WSTF test cycle provided 
evidence of the distinction between the modeling 
techniques.  Prior to those tests, only 2D analyses were 
performed.  These did not provide the predictive results 
of energy loss due to component slippage. However, 
that failure phenomenon was validated via analysis 
utilizing a 3D model. 
 
The ultimate goal is to create a model that can provide 
predictive results for varying joint geometries and 
configurations. The optimization process may illustrate 
that the functional margin can be increased 
significantly. The analytical results should show where 
energy is lost or misdirected.  Once discovered, it can be 
mitigated. The outcome will be a configuration that 
routinely breaks the joint using minimized explosive 
cord loads. That would provide a functional margin and 
the potential to lower the pyro shock transferred to the 
vehicle.   
 
In mid-2016, the JSC Pyrotechnics Group will conduct 
tests at ESTA and WSTF.  These tests are described in 
detail below. 
 
The ESTA firings will be conducted in pairs, where two 
tests will be performed on one test article. The test 
article will have the primary and secondary expanding 
tube assemblies (XTAs) installed in the joint, but only 
one XTA will be functioned at a time. The first firing 
will show positive separation of the joint. The unfired 
XTA will then be functioned. The second test 
configuration is to show that the XTA, when fired and 
when not using the resultant energy to fracture the joint, 
remains contained within the joint half. This is a critical 
design feature needed to prevent the highly detrimental 
release of excess Foreign Object Debris (FOD). Two 
separate joint subscale article will be tested. 
 
The Project will conduct the structural load testing. This 
will require the evaluation of joint sections in both 
tension and compression. The results should show a 
positive margin in either case and should also align with 
the LS-DYNA model predictions. 
 
Following the JSC test campaign, the intent is to return 
to WSTF, where the Pyrotechnic group will conduct 
two additional test firings. The newly designed test 
articles will be configured exactly as they were for the 
ESTA tests.  However, only one XTA will be 
functioned to effect separation. Eliminating the second 
XTA functioning precludes the potential of damaging 
expensive hardware test assets, due to excessive energy  
release. 
 
FUTURE FLAT-H FRANGIBLE JOINT TESTS 
In fall 2016, a series of functional tests at the WSTF 
will be scheduled to understand the complex separation 
dynamics of the new joint design. The WSTF test data 
will provide substantial detail regarding the effects, 
which will support enhanced analysis modeling 
verification. Several tests will be identified to 
sufficiently establish the feasibility of a new design. 
This test plan will accompany a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) between the NASA Engineering 
and Safety Center (NESC), the JSC Pyrotechnics 
Group, and JSC Safety to leverage single-use 
instrumentation assets, including digital image 
correlation, photon Doppler velocimetry (PDV), and 
other cameras as needed, at WSTF. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The pyrotechnic industry relies upon single-lot control, 
quality assurance, and rigorous testing to develop 
confidence in SFT device designs. However, even in 
ideal situations where these practices are fully 
implemented, process escapes still occur during 
production. For frangible joints, which rely on subscale, 
instead of flight-like test articles, assurance in reliability 
diminishes. While SFT is the standard for pyrotechnic 
devices used in human-rated vehicles, such devices 
must become commercially available, just like the ZFT 
devices utilized on non-crewed vehicles. 
 
The causes of frangible joint pyrotechnic failures have 
proven elusive. Both of the failure cases presented in 
this paper lack full explanations.   Given the majority of 
failures have no determined root cause, there may be 
more problems lurking than testing has exposed.  
 
Substantial effort has been invested to completely 
understand the failure modes and design sensitivities of 
frangible joint devices. Even with a comprehensive 
understanding of frangible joint technologies, human 
errors, such as improper installation, poor handling 
methods, deficient procedures, inadequate 
manufacturing methods, and substandard materials and 
faulty workmanship, are inevitably a risk to crew safety, 
and must be controlled and effects mitigated.  The SFT 
frangible joint achieves redundancy and increased 
reliability, and crew safety through pyrotechnically 
failure tolerant design utilizing a single fracture plane.   
